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Think of the Children: How the Role of Students in
the Classroom Informs Future Applications of
Garcetti v. Ceballos in Academic Contexts
INTRODUCTION
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,1 the Supreme Court determined that public
employees may raise successful First Amendment speech claims only
when speaking in their capacity as private citizens. Although this rule
applies to almost all public employees, the Court specifically chose not
to answer whether this rule applies to “speech related to scholarship or
teaching” because there “is some argument that expression related to
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s
customary employee-speech jurisprudence.”2 In subsequent cases, the
circuit courts have split concerning this potential exception to the
Garcetti rule. Similarly, First Amendment scholars have disagreed on
whether professors should have greater First Amendment protection
than other public employees.
Although several different arguments have arisen on both sides of
the debate (mostly dealing with whether academic freedom should
protect an academic institution or individual teachers), very little has
been published by judges or scholars concerning how the role of
students in the classroom should factor into determining whether
professors’ speech should receive greater protection than the speech of
other public employees. This relative silence is startling because
students are clearly the primary targets of “speech related
to . . . teaching” and “classroom instruction,” and consequently
deserve some analytical attention. For example, if courts wish to justify
giving additional protection to professors’ speech by stating that the
classroom is “peculiarly the marketplace of ideas,” a justification the
Supreme Court has previously stressed when discussing the First
Amendment rights of teachers, 3 it seems necessary that future courts

1. 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
2. Id. at 425.
3. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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consider whether students are capable of truly participating in such a
marketplace. Additionally, regardless of the justification for
protecting professors’ speech, it is also necessary to determine
whether students should be considered captive audiences, which
would make their interests as listeners much more important in a First
Amendment analysis.
This Note contributes to the post-Garcetti debate concerning
professors’ free speech rights by introducing the rights and roles of
students to the discussion. Consideration of students’ rights and
roles leads to the conclusion that professors should be given greater
free speech protection for their speech related to scholarship but not
for their speech related to teaching. Part II of this Note reviews the
pertinent Supreme Court and circuit court cases on professors’
speech. Part II discusses the post-Garcetti scholarship that has
considered whether Garcetti should apply to speech related to
teaching and scholarship. Part III considers the relevance of students
to the issue, identifying studies and other sources that demonstrate
students’ general inability to participate in a marketplace of ideas
within the classroom and their potential status as captive audiences. 4
Part IV proposes that, in light of these insights, future courts should
separate speech related to teaching from speech related to
scholarship for purposes of the Garcetti rule, exempting the latter,
but not the former. Parts V and VI defend this proposal from likely
criticisms and provide a concluding summary.
I. BACKGROUND
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has been very supportive of
professors’ speech in the classroom. In fact, in 2003, the Court
noted, “We have long recognized that, given the important purpose
of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and
thought associated with the university environment, universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.” 5 Despite the
special niche that has existed for professors’ speech, the Garcetti

4. This paper will focus primarily on undergraduate students at colleges or universities.
It is generally assumed, for purposes of this paper, that if undergraduate students are unable to
participate in a marketplace of ideas within a classroom, elementary and secondary students will
be at least as unable to participate therein. The same assumption is true for any captive
audience argument.
5. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
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Court’s hesitancy to shield such speech from its rule has opened the
door for federal courts to reexamine whether professorial speech
should receive any special treatment. This section will briefly examine
some of the Court’s pre-Garcetti discussion of academic freedom 6
and the role Garcetti and its progeny have played in challenging the
added protection that professors’ speech had acquired.
A. Supreme Court Academic Freedom Cases
One of the first opinions to suggest that professors’ speech
might require greater protection than the speech of other public
employees was Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in the 1952
case Wieman v. Updegraff. 7 In Wieman, the Court ruled that an
Oklahoma statute that required all public employees to take a
“loyalty” oath violated the Due Process Clause. 8 The oath required
public employees to swear that they were not currently—nor had
been within in the past five years—affiliated with any organization
that had “been officially determined by the United States Attorney
General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a
communist front or subversive organization.” 9 While concurring in
the opinion, Justice Frankfurter wrote separately to emphasize why
the statute’s application to university professors was particularly
problematic. 10 Justice Frankfurter summarized the problem as
follows:
It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of openmindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible
citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective
public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and
practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be
exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry
out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a
responsible and critical mind are denied to them. 11

6. The cases to be discussed have been selected based on their prominence in Justice
Souter’s dissent in Garcetti and the majority opinion in Grutter.
7. 344 U.S. 183, 194–98 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 184 (majority opinion).
9. Id. at 186.
10. Id. at 194 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 196.

985

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/22/2015 4:01 PM

2014

Although only one other Justice joined Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence, the essence of Frankfurter’s idea that teachers have the
special responsibility to foster “habits of open-mindedness and critical
inquiry” was later adopted by a majority of Justices as a principal
reason for the academic freedom theory of professorial speech.
Five years after Wieman, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of professorial academic freedom in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire. 12 In Sweezy, the Court ruled that a district court had
improperly held a university professor in contempt for refusing to
answer the Attorney General’s questions concerning his associations
with the Progressive Party and the content of several lectures he had
provided to university classes. 13 While the Court did not indicate
how much scrutiny government action would be given when
academic freedom was restricted, 14 the Court emphatically stated in
dicta that “[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation,” and that “[t]eachers and students must always remain free
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.” 15
Despite this strong language, the Court did not rely on the academic
freedom theory in its actual holding; instead, it found the actions
unconstitutional on due process grounds. 16
The Court’s last landmark academic freedom case dealing with
professors’ free speech rights occurred ten years after Sweezy. In
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 17 several faculty members of a public
university challenged provisions of New York law that made
“treasonous or seditious” utterances grounds for dismissal from

12. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
13. Id. at 237–42, 249–50.
14. The Court declined to answer this question after concluding that the Attorney
General’s questions violated the Due Process Clause because there was no government interest
of any kind in having the Attorney General obtain information concerning the professor’s past
speech and associations. Id. at 254–55.
15. Id. at 250.
16. Id. at 254–55 (“The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the
information the Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner must be treated as the
absence of authority. It follows that the use of the contempt power, notwithstanding the
interference with constitutional rights, was not in accordance with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
17. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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public service. 18 After the faculty members failed to sign a certificate
stating that they were not affiliated with the Communist party, in
accordance with regulations passed pursuant to those provisions,
each member became subject to dismissal; one of them, Keyishian,
was denied a contract renewal as a result. 19 The Court again noted
the importance of academic freedom by stating that “[o]ur Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,” and, more
specifically, that “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection.’” 20 As with the previous cases,
however, the Court did not rely on the academic freedom theory in
its holding but found that the relevant provisions were
unconstitutional because they were vague and overly broad. 21
Two final cases merit some brief discussion because of their
contribution to the general theory of academic freedom, even
though they are not freedom of speech cases. In Regents of
University of California v. Bakke 22 and Grutter v. Bollinger, 23 the
Court addressed whether certain college and university admission
programs were constitutional. Although coming to opposite
conclusions for the individual programs at issue, 24 the Court in each
instance stated that “[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its
student body.” 25 These cases indicated that academic freedom, at
least sometimes, functions at an institutional level. This result has led
to tension between the competing concepts of institutional academic

18. Id. at 593–95.
19. Id. at 592.
20. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (D.N.Y.
1943)).
21. Id. at 603, 608–10.
22. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
23. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
24. In Bakke, the admission program at issue was deemed unconstitutional because it
functioned as an impermissible quota program. 438 U.S. at 319–20. In Grutter, the Court
held that the admission program at issue was permissible because it did not function as a quota
program. 539 U.S. at 335–36.
25. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (endorsing that line from Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke).
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freedom and the academic freedom of individual professors. This
tension has come to the forefront of First Amendment jurisprudence
in the wake of Garcetti.
B. The Garcetti Rule and Subsequent Circuit Court Split
Although Garcetti v. Cabellos did not directly involve academic
speech, the Court’s opinion in Garcetti has given courts and scholars
reason to debate how much First Amendment protection academic
speech deserves. Garcetti involved a deputy district attorney who
wrote a disposition memorandum for his employer and participated
as a witness for the defense in challenging a warrant. 26 The attorney
did not dispute that these actions were consistent with his official
duties as a prosecutor. 27 The attorney claimed that after taking these
actions he was “subjected to a series of retaliatory employment
actions.” 28
After the attorney’s employment grievance was denied based on
a finding that his employer had not actually retaliated against him,
the attorney filed a lawsuit claiming that his employer had violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments through the alleged
retaliatory actions. 29 The Court noted that its past decisions sought
“both to promote the individual and societal interests that are
served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public
concern and to respect the needs of government employers
attempting to perform their important public functions.” 30 “With
these principles in mind,” the Court concluded “that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.” 31 Consequently, the
attorney could not bring a First Amendment claim against his
governmental employer because his speech (writing the memo) was
pursuant to his official duties. 32

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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After so ruling, the Court acknowledged Justice Souter’s dissent,
which argued that the majority’s “decision may have important
ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional
value.” 33 In his dissent, Justice Souter used Keyishian and Sweezy to
demonstrate that “[academic] freedom is . . . a special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.”34 This special concern led Justice
Souter to state, “I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean
to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write
‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’” 35 In response to these concerns, the
majority chose not to decide “whether the analysis we conduct today
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to
scholarship or teaching.” 36 As a result, Garcetti left circuit courts
without any direction for how to handle future First Amendment
claims brought by professors against their governmental employers.
It is no surprise, therefore, that in the eight years since Garcetti,
the circuit courts have split regarding whether the new public
employee rule should extend to speech related to scholarship or
teaching. 37
Two circuits, the Third and Seventh, have held that, despite the
concerns expressed in Justice Souter’s dissent, the Garcetti rule
applies to teachers and professors, at least in some circumstances. In a
case where a tenured professor was allegedly disciplined for assisting a
student athlete, the Third Circuit applied the Garcetti rule, but only
after acknowledging Justice Souter’s academic freedom concerns and
emphasizing that the professor’s actions “clearly were not ‘speech
related to scholarship or teaching.’” 38 While such an application does
not address the ultimate issue, it does show that the Third Circuit is
33. Id. at 425.
34. Id. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 438 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
36. Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
37. In addition to the circuit court split, two circuits have thus far explicitly declined to
rule on the matter. See Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934–35 (2d Cir. 2008)
(recognizing the circuit split but declining to rule on the matter because the appellant did not
raise the issue on appeal); Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court left “undecided
the many questions relating to the concept and breadth of academic freedom” but choosing to
not resolve the issue because the case did not “raise any serious questions” about the issue).
38. Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009).
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willing to extend the Garcetti rule to cover some speech from
professors pursuant to their official duties.
Going even further, the Seventh Circuit has been willing to apply
Garcetti across the board. 39 In Renken v. Gregory, the court applied
Garcetti to a professor who was allegedly punished for speaking out
to his university’s administration about the proposed use of grant
funds. 40 Despite extending Garcetti, the court did not explicitly
inquire into whether the rule should apply to speech related to
teaching and scholarship. This changed in Mayor v. Monroe, where
the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment that
applied Garcetti to a teacher whose contract was not renewed after
she took a stance—during an elementary school class that she was
teaching—against the United States’ military involvement in Iraq. 41
In affirming the judgment, the Seventh Circuit stated that Garcetti
applied because “the school system does not ‘regulate’ teachers’
speech as much as it hires that speech.” 42 Additionally, the court
found that “pupils are a captive audience” because their education is
compulsory and because they are likely to be indoctrinated. 43 The
court concluded “the first amendment does not entitle primary and
secondary teachers, when conducting the education of captive
audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart from
the curriculum adopted by the school system.” 44
On the other side of the spectrum, the Fourth 45 and Ninth 46
Circuits have held that the Garcetti rule does not apply to speech
related to teaching and scholarship at any level. The Fourth Circuit
exempted this speech simply because the Supreme Court “explicitly

39. See Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2008); Mayer v. Monroe
Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2007).
40. Renken, 541 F.3d at 774 ( “Renken was speaking as a faculty employee, and not as a
private citizen, because administering the grant as a PI fell within the teaching and service
duties that he was employed to perform.”).
41. 474 F.3d at 478, 480.
42. Id. at 479 (“Expression is a teacher’s stock in trade, the commodity she sells to her
employer in exchange for a salary. A teacher hired to lead a social-studies class can’t use it as a
platform for a revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn’t really a traitor, when the
approved program calls him one . . . .”).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 480.
45. Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011); Lee
v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007).
46. Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2013).
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did not decide whether this analysis would apply in the same manner
to a case involving speech related to teaching.” 47 The Ninth Circuit
exempted the speech after conducting a thorough analysis of
Garcetti and concluding that “if applied to teaching and academic
writing, Garcetti would directly conflict with the important First
Amendment values previously articulated by the Supreme Court.” 48
Specifically, the court noted that the academic freedom principles
discussed in Keyishian, Sweezy, and Grutter could not be adequately
preserved unless speech related to teaching and scholarship is exempt
from the Garcetti rule. 49
The differences in the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits—and similarly the differences in the reasoning of the Third
and Seventh Circuits—demonstrate that even where circuits agree
concerning the proper application of Garcetti, they are still split as to
why the conclusion is proper. This indicates a need for more
guidance from the Supreme Court. Additionally, despite the many
different reasons given for extending or not extending Garcetti in
these cases, none of them include a detailed analysis of how the role
of students in the classroom should factor into the determination.
This is especially true with regard to the role of college students in
the classroom.
II. POST-GARCETTI SCHOLARSHIP
Not only has the Garcetti opinion caused a division among the
circuit courts, but it has also sparked a debate among legal scholars.
Within the post-Garcetti scholarship addressing the rule’s application
to speech related to scholarship or teaching, scholars generally fit
into three categories: 50 those who conclude that Garcetti should
apply to both scholarship and teaching, those who maintain that
Garcetti should not apply to either scholarship or teaching, and

47. Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 n.11; see also Adams, 640 F.3d at 562–64.
48. Demers, 729 F.3d at 1019.
49. Id. at 1019–20.
50. There is also a fourth category of scholars who do not proscribe a specific
application but simply summarize the current state of the academic freedom theory. See, e.g.,
Oren R. Griffin, Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech in the Post-Garcetti World, 37
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2013). Due to its primarily descriptive nature, such scholarship is less
applicable to the topic at hand and will not be summarized in this section.
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those who contend that Garcetti should apply in some situations but
not in others.
Scholars in the first category, who would apply Garcetti to both
scholarship and teaching, commonly argue that the academic
freedom theory is not at odds with an extension of Garcetti because
the theory covers only the academic institution, not individual
professors. 51 Some of these scholars also call into question the very
idea that a classroom is “peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.” 52
Regardless of the reasoning, these scholars believe that speech related
to teaching and scholarship is not sufficiently different from the
speech of ordinary government employees to justify an exemption to
the Garcetti rule.
Scholars who contend against applying Garcetti to speech related
to teaching and scholarship argue that application of the rule would
prevent students from developing necessary skills and discourage
professors from acquiring and teaching the cutting-edge knowledge
that is vital to a proper education. 53 These scholars also emphasize the
aspirational language of the Supreme Court’s early academic freedom
cases to demonstrate that all professorial academic speech deserves
more First Amendment protection than the speech of other
governmental employees. 54
51. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Caballos
Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 645–49, 656 (2012) (arguing that Garcetti should at
least apply to some speech related to academia and teaching because teachers must be
evaluated on their speech for job performance).
52. Nancy J. Whitmore, First Amendment Showdown: Intellectual Diversity Mandates
and the Academic Marketplace, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 321, 337–38 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“The academic marketplace functions neither as an economic
marketplace driven by laws of supply and demand nor as a wide-open, uninhibited marketplace
where multitudes of differing ideas can clash.”).
53. See, e.g., Hilary Habib, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Garcetti
Era, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509, 535 (2013) (“A university is a setting unique from the
public institutions like the DMV because, in a public university setting, professors’ First
Amendment protection is crucial to engaging students in critical thought.”); Darryn Cathryn
Beckstrom, Note, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic Speech After
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1230 (2010) (“If [learning and entering into a
marketplace of ideas] is the purpose of the modern public university, then government control
over the ideas presented by academics makes no sense.”); David Fox, Note, Turning Up the
Heat on Science: A New Threat to Academic Freedom, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 173, 193 (2011)
(arguing that Garcetti should not apply to professors’ speech because “[c]ourts . . . cannot
continue to take a back seat to these types of issues and hope that the scientists and public
interest groups can adequately defend the freedom of inquiry”).
54. See, e.g., Beckstrom, supra note 53, at 1219–20, 1238 (discussing the academic
freedom principles articulated in Sweezy, Keyishian, Bakke, and Grutter and concluding that
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Scholars in the final category have taken a more nuanced
approach to whether Garcetti should cover speech related to
teaching and scholarship. Instead of seeking a wholesale extension of
or exemption to the rule, these scholars point out that in some
contexts speech related to scholarship might deserve more First
Amendment protection than speech related to teaching. 55
Specifically, these scholars argue that at elementary and secondary
schools, speech related to teaching should be governed by Garcetti
whereas speech related to scholarship might be exempted from such
governance. 56 Because “teaching and scholarship may often be
intertwined at the university level,” 57 and for reasons discussed
later, 58 these scholars decline to determine whether this division
should apply to college professors and whether college professors’
academic speech should be governed by the Garcetti rule. 59
None of the scholars provide more than a minimal evaluation of
what function the role of students in the classroom should play in
determining whether Garcetti should apply to speech related to
teaching and scholarship.60 This paper will argue that, after considering

“[a]pplying the public employee speech doctrine to academic speech is inappropriate. When
the government creates a public university, part of the bargain is academic freedom”); Erica
Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of Deference”: Institutional Academic Freedom
in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217, 249–52 (2011) (“Institutional
academic freedom should not be used to squash the academic freedom rights of students or
professors . . . . Academic freedom rights should protect professors above and beyond the free
speech rights of individual employees, even when counterbalanced against institutional
academic freedom.”); Lauren K. Ross, Note, Pursuing Academic Freedom After Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1253, 1281 (2013) (“[T]he Court should recognize a
constitutional right to academic freedom that protects professors’ speech, as long as it is related
to the academic purpose of the university.”).
55. See, e.g., Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply
to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 697, 715 (2011) (“Proceeding under
employee speech analysis, primary and secondary teaching should not receive an exemption
from the Garcetti rule.”).
56. See, e.g., id. at 697 (concluding that Garcetti should apply to teaching but noting
that “[d]ifferent sorts of First Amendment protection may be appropriate for scholarship than
for teaching because scholarship requires the ability to freely pursue research and candidly
share results, while teaching primarily involves the conveyance of information prescribed by the
curriculum”).
57. Id. at 697.
58. See infra Part IV.B.
59. See, e.g., Forster, supra note 55, at 713–15.
60. See, e.g., Whitmore, supra note 52, at 377 (“Regardless of the outcome, students
appear to have the least amount of freedom in the academic marketplace, and are the most
vulnerable to the choices of others.”).
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the role students play in the classroom, the separation of speech related
to scholarship and speech related to teaching can—and should—apply
to college professors in addition to elementary and secondary school
teachers.
III. STUDENTS’ ROLE IN SPEECH CONCERNING TEACHING AND
SCHOLARSHIP
Prominently absent from every case and scholarly work discussed
herein is an in-depth evaluation of how the interests of students should
factor into whether the Garcetti rule should extend to speech related to
teaching and scholarship. Although several cases have asserted that
professors must have added First Amendment protection because of
their special relationship with students,61 none have provided any
analysis into whether that relationship actually functions in a manner
that merits giving the professors’ speech added protection. This
section argues that no such added protection should be granted
because an undergraduate classroom is not a true marketplace of ideas
and because undergraduates are effectively captive audiences. 62
A. Student Participation in the Marketplace of Ideas
Courts 63 and scholars 64 alike have asserted that the classroom is a
quintessential marketplace of ideas. Typically, the Supreme Court has
used the marketplace of ideas metaphor within First Amendment
cases to signify a public forum in which ideas can be freely presented
and discussed, with the ultimate goal of ascertaining which ideas are

61. See supra Part I.
62. Admittedly, many of the factors that chill student speech in elementary, secondary,
and undergraduate classrooms do not exist in post-graduate classrooms. For example, graduate
students are generally older (and, consequently, their brains are more mature), they have more
knowledge about the subjects they are pursuing, and they are likely to be less worried about
what their peers may think of them. However, the fact that professors are still the ultimate
judges over student work in graduate classes (in addition to other concerns such as the fact
that students want to be able to obtain glowing letters of recommendation from their graduate
professors) might have a sufficient chilling effect on student speech to make a separation
between speech related to teaching and speech related to scholarship appropriate even in that
context.
63. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972) (“The college classroom . . . is
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967)) (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249–50 (1957)).
64. See, e.g., Beckstrom, supra note 53, at 1202.
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true. 65 Some critics have argued, however, that such a marketplace is
a utopian idea that, in general, does not actually exist. 66
Whether this broad claim is true, several factors demonstrate
that an undergraduate classroom is not a true marketplace of ideas.
Among these factors are the impressionability of typical
undergraduates, the inability of undergraduates to truly challenge
their professors, and other features of undergraduate education
that influence students to stay quiet in the classroom. These
factors tend to create a classroom in which the professor’s word is
completely authoritative and in which alternative ideas from
anyone else are not likely to be presented in a persuasive manner.
1. Impressionability of undergraduates
The impressionable nature of an average-aged undergraduate is
evident from neurological studies. For example, a Dartmouth
College study indicated that the brains of 18-year-old college
students are still going through a hard-wiring process. 67 The study
was conducted by using magnetic resonance imaging to track the
changes of nineteen Dartmouth freshmen. 68 The results suggested
that the 18-year-olds showed “a dramatic burst of brain
development . . . concentrated in the white matter, which is
essentially the wiring that connects various parts of the brain.” 69
After comparing these results to the results found from a control
group consisting of several 25- to 35-year-old students, one of the
researchers affirmatively stated that “[t]he brain of an 18-year-old
college freshman is still far from resembling the brain of someone in
their mid-twenties.” 70

65. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”).
66. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010).
67. Brain Changes Significantly After Age 18, Says Dartmouth Research, DARTMOUTH
NEWS (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~news/releases/2006/02/06.html; Steve
Zind, Dartmouth Study Looks at Adult Brain Development, VERMONT PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 13,
2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.vpr.net/news_detail/74456/dartmouth-study-looks-at-adultbrain-development/.
68. Brain Changes Significantly After Age 18, supra note 67; Zind, supra note 67.
69. Zind, supra note 67.
70. Brain Changes Significantly After Age 18, supra note 67.
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Other neuroscientists have indicated that the results of the
Dartmouth study are not unique to young college students. Indeed,
according to neuroscientist Sandra Aamodt, “brain scans show
clearly that the brain is not fully finished developing until about age
25.” 71 Additionally, Aamodt noted that an 18-year-old’s brain is only
about “halfway through [the] process” of developing its prefrontal
cortex, which is “the part of the brain that helps you to inhibit
impulses and to plan and organize your behavior to reach a goal.” 72
Other neurologists and psychologists have supported Aamodt’s
assessment as well. 73 A logical inference from these conclusions is
that because college-aged brains are still developing, college students
are more likely than individuals with fully developed brains to simply
mimic the beliefs expressed by authority figures—such as
professors. 74
Additional evidence in support of this inference derives from the
fact that the ongoing brain development in 18- to 25-year-olds
correlates with a significant shift in political leanings from college
students’ freshman to senior years. For example, a national survey
conducted by the Cooperative Institutional Research Program at the
Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA suggested that, in
71. Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years, NPR (Oct. 11, 2011, 12:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141164708.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Lucy Wallis, Is 25 the New Cut-Off Point for Adulthood?, BBC NEWS (Sept.
23, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24173194 (reporting on the United
Kingdom’s new policy that allows children psychologists to work with their patients until the
age of 25, up from the age of 18); Elizabeth Williamson, Brain Immaturity Could Explain
Teen Crash Rate: Risky Behavior Diminishes at Age 25, NIH Study Finds, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,
2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A526872005Jan31_2.html (discussing a study performed by the NIH’s Institute of Mental Health and
UCLA’s Laboratory of Neuro Imaging that concluded that “the point of intellectual
maturity . . . comes at about age 25”).
74. This seems to be a plausible conclusion because the abilities affected by the
prefrontal cortex are those “such as planning, reasoning and problem solving.” Simon
Gerhand, The Prefrontal Cortex—Executive and Cognitive Functions, 122 BRAIN 993, 994
(1999) (reviewing THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX—EXECUTIVE AND COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS (A.
C. Roberts et al. eds., 1998)), available at http://brain.oxfordjournals.org
/content/122/5/994.full.pdf+html. Put simply, if a student does not possess fully developed
reasoning and problem-solving skills, it seems unlikely that the student will be able to come up
with alternatives to a professor’s ideas (or the student may simply not think through the
professor’s ideas thoroughly enough to realize the professor might be wrong). Consequently,
because college students—who pay to attend classes—presumably attend classes to learn and
succeed (rather than rebel like students who are forced to attend classes), they are likely to
simply parrot the professor instead of thinking of alternatives.
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general, students become significantly more liberal during their four
years in college. 75 Some groups have used this conclusion to
demonstrate that college professors use their authoritative capacity in
the classroom to impose their liberal views on their students, 76
especially because it is unquestionably clear that a majority of college
professors nation-wide characterize themselves as liberals. 77 Other
groups, however, argue that the political shifting of college students
is not significantly more dramatic than the shift that occurs during
the same ages among people who do not attend college. 78
Regardless of whether the views of college students change more
dramatically than non–college students, what is clear is that many

75. AMY LIU ET AL., COOP. INST. RESEARCH PROGRAM AT THE HIGHER EDUC.
UCLA, FINDINGS FROM THE 2008 ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLLEGE
SENIOR SURVEY (CSS): NATIONAL AGGREGATES 30 (2009), available at
http://www.heri.ucla.edu/PDFs/pubs/Reports/CSS2008_FinalReport.pdf. Some of the
significant statistics include that from the time students enrolled in college to the time they
were ready to graduate, there was a 9% increase in students who characterized themselves as
“Liberal of Far Left,” a 14% increase in students who believed that “[m]arijuana should be
legalized,” a 13% increase in students who believed that “[homosexual] couples should have
the right to legal marital status,” and a 12% increase in students who believed that “[a]bortion
should be legal.” Id.
76. See, e.g., Jill Laster, College Makes Students More Liberal, but Not Smarter About
HIGHER
EDUC.
(Feb.
5,
2010),
available
at
Civics,
CHRON.
http://chronicle.com/article/College-Makes-Students-More/64040/ (“The institute found
that people who had attained at least a bachelor’s degree were more likely than Americans
whose formal education ended with a high-school diploma to take a liberal stance on certain
controversial social issues.”) (citing INTERCOLLEGIATE STUDIES INST., THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN
MIND
(2009),
available
at
https://chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/
2010%20Civic%20Lit%20Report%2012%2015%20FINAL_small_2_0.pdf).
77. Scott Jaschik, Moving Further to the Left, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 24, 2012),
available at https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/24/survey-finds-professorsalready-liberal-have-moved-further-left (analyzing a 2010–2011 study that indicates that 62.7%
of “full-time faculty members at four-year colleges and universities” identify as either “Far
Left” or “Liberal”); see also Neil Gross, The Indoctrination Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012, at
SR12 (“[A] survey of more than 1,400 professors . . . conducted in 2006, covering academics
in nearly all fields and in institutions ranging from community colleges to elite universities, . . .
found that about half of the professors identified as liberal, as compared to just one in five
Americans over all.”).
78. Scott Jaschik, Faculty Are Liberal—Who Cares?, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 27,
2008), available at http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/27/politics (describing
a study that concluded that “college students graduate with a smaller share of people
identifying as ‘far left’ than does the 18–24 year old cohort of the U.S. population” and
providing a chart that demonstrates that 29.1% of college seniors self-identify as “liberal”
compared to 28.7% of the “18–24 year old cohort in U.S.”). Admittedly, if this is true, then
college aged individuals might be impressionable but not overly affected by professors.
RESEARCH INST. AT
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college students do change their world-views. 79 Consequently, it is
not hard to imagine that anything a respected elder, such as a college
professor, promotes to students at this stage in their lives could
heavily influence the viewpoints they adopt and the decisions they
make for better or worse. 80 This impressionability, while not
inherently problematic, should give some pause to courts when
deciding how much leeway to give professors’ speech in a classroom.
2. Inability to challenge professors
On top of being generally impressionable, college students are
also generally unable or unwilling to challenge the ideas their
professors may promote. The most obvious problem in this regard is
that professors are experts in their fields whereas college students
often have little or no outside knowledge of the topics discussed in
class. In other words, college students, in general, simply do not
have enough information at their disposal to provide a compelling
opinion that contradicts the opinion of the professor.
Even if students did have sufficient information to challenge a
professor’s opinion in class, many students will be discouraged from
doing so for one simple reason: the professor controls their grades.
There is evidence that students frequently care more about the
grades they earn than about actually learning or ascertaining the
truth. For example, some teachers admit that they do not believe in
the grading system precisely because they believe that grading is a
“flawed system that teaches students to only do the minimum to get
a certain grade.” 81 The incentive to focus on grades stems from the
reality that a student’s ability to obtain admission into a desirable
graduate program82 or to acquire a desirable job 83 largely depends on
79. Although this susceptibility could potentially be explained through other factors,
impressionability seems to be the most plausible explanation (for the neurological reasons
already discussed).
80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Trent M. Kays, Grades Are Arbitrary, Learning Is Not, MINN. DAILY (Nov.
21, 2011), http://www.mndaily.com/2011/11/21/grades-are-arbitrary-learning-not.
82. See, e.g., Claudine Vainrub, The Importance of Grades for College, EDUPLAN (Sept.
21, 2010), available at http://www.eduplan.us/the-importance-of-grades-for-college/
(explaining that when applying for either college or for a graduate program “if your grades
aren’t great, everything else will have to be”).
83. David Koeppel, Those Low Grades in College May Haunt Your Job Search, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/jobs/31gpa.html
?pagewanted=all; Ken Sundheim, The Important of Getting Good Grades in College,
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the grades the student achieves in college. Students know that they
cannot fully indicate (nor could employers or admission officers
discern) everything they have learned in college. Instead, they must
use grades as a proxy. 84 To borrow an oft-used First Amendment
phrase, this obsession with grades coupled with the knowledge that a
professor’s impression of a student directly affects that student’s
grades certainly “chills” 85 the speech of many students who may
otherwise be capable and willing to challenge the ideas their
professor promotes. 86
3. Other factors that keep students quiet
In addition to their comparative lack of knowledge and their
dependence on professors in the grading system, students may
refrain from challenging their professors’ ideas in the classroom for
other reasons. After struggling to figure out how to help quiet
students speak up in class, one university professor decided to survey
the self-described quiet students in her class to determine why they
chose to stay silent during class. 87 To her surprise, many of their

EXAMINER.COM,

(Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/article/the-important-ofgetting-good-grades-college.
84. Admittedly, many people also try to emphasize to college students that grades are
ultimately not that important; however, while the importance of grades is almost certainly
evident to most students by the time they are in college (even without being counseled on
their importance), the fact that there is so much emphasis on why grades are not ultimately
important actually seems to indicate that grade obsession is a very real thing. See, e.g., Lauren
Landry, Why Grades Just Don’t Matter, BOSTINNO, (July 30, 2012, 11:50 AM),
http://bostinno.streetwise.co/2012/07/30/why-grades-just-dont-matter/ (“[Grades are]
[t]he singular thing every student strives for.”); Lauren Schuhmacher, Why Grades Don’t
Really Matter That Much After All, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:07 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-schuhmacher/why-grades-dont-really-ma_b_2
682922.html (“The current perception of the importance of grades in academia dumbfounds
me, because I think that by caring too much about grades, most students are missing the
point of education.”).
85. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 620 n.9
(2003) (“The Court has long cautioned that, to avoid chilling protected speech, the
government must bear the burden of proving that the speech it seeks to prohibit is
unprotected.” (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958))).
86. Truly, some professors may value opposing opinions and reward students who
explore them, but likely not most professors, at least based on this author’s experience.
87. Mary M. Reda, What’s the Problem with Quiet Students? Anyone? Anyone?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 5, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Whats-the-Problem-WithQuiet/124258/.
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reasons for staying quiet had nothing to do with grades. 88 The
professor discovered that students “also consider their self-images,
their knowledge, and their comfort levels with criticism and
confrontation in the classroom setting when deciding whether to
speak or be silent.” 89 The quiet students in her class, who are likely
similar to quiet students elsewhere, were particularly concerned that
a misstatement or a misunderstanding in the classroom would create
an unfixable rift between the student who misspoke and the rest of
the class. 90 This means that even if a student is not susceptible to
changing her opinion based on the views of an authority figure, has
enough knowledge on the subject to adequately challenge the
professor, and is not worried about the potential negative effect on
her grade such a challenge may have, that student may still not
challenge the professor’s viewpoints in the classroom because the
challenge may give her peers a negative impression of her.
All of these hindrances to student challenges to professors’
viewpoints illustrate that a college classroom is not a true
marketplace of ideas because the truth of the views promoted by the
professors will rarely be meaningfully challenged. 91 Thus, although a
college classroom is undoubtedly a very important learning
environment, it is not a place where multiple parties are engaging
each other with speech and counter-speech to actively ascertain the
truth. Consequently, future courts should not justify a teaching
exception to the Garcetti rule by stating that the classroom, even in a
college or a university, is peculiarly a marketplace of ideas.
B. Students as Captive Audience
Students are also relevant to the question of professorial speech
rights for another reason: students may constitute a captive audience

88. Id. She also noted, however, that “[t]he more pressure a professor creates through
grading class participation, the more complicated it becomes for students to speak.” Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. In addition to the factors laid out here, legal scholars have also noted that a
teacher’s ability to start and stop discussion at a whim and her ability to potentially humiliate
the students are also factors that lead to the inevitable conclusion that added protection to
teachers’ (and, similarly, professors’) classroom speech cannot be justified by stating that the
classroom is peculiarly a marketplace of ideas. See, e.g., Howard O. Hunter, Curriculum,
Pedagogy, and the Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 62 (1983).

1000

DO NOT DELETE

983

5/22/2015 4:01 PM

Think of the Children

even at the collegiate level. Past Supreme Court rulings have made
clear that otherwise protected speech may be restricted due to the
captive nature of the audience. 92 Courts have already indicated that
elementary and secondary students (often referred to as pupils)
constitute captive audiences in certain contexts, 93 but no court has
held the same concerning college students. Due to the increasing
economic pressure to attend college and due to the mandatory class
requirements imposed by colleges and universities, in many ways
college students are effectively a captive audience as well.
Importantly, the Supreme Court, in other First Amendment
contexts, has already shown a willingness to imply that an audience is
captive even when members of the audience are not legally required
to attend. 94
1. Differences between pupils and college students
Many scholars have argued that college students are not a captive
audience, based on differences between college students and pupils,
who clearly qualify as captive audiences. 95 The most obvious
difference that scholars have identified is that “[u]nlike college and
university students, pupils are compelled to attend school until a
specified age.” 96 College attendance is much more voluntary, at least
in a legal sense, than elementary school or secondary school
attendance. Other differences include the following: pupils are
minors and minors deserve a much higher level of protection from
certain types of speech; 97 college students have a greater opportunity
92. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000); Rowan v. U.S. Post
Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (validating a statute that allowed people to remove
their names from a mailing list for erotic materials).
93. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Muller ex rel.
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1541 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Children in public
schools are a ‘captive audience’ that ‘school authorities acting in loco parentis’ may ‘protect.’”
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684)).
94. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992) (“Attendance may not be
required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the
graduation exercise in any real sense of the term ‘voluntary,’ for absence would require
forfeiture of those intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all
her high school years.”).
95. See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 54 (2008).
96. Rachel F. Moran, Let Freedom Ring: Making Grutter Matter in School Desegregation
Cases, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 503 (2009).
97. See Forster, supra note 55, at 714 (noting that pupils should be treated differently
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to respond to teachers’ speech; 98 college students select which school
to attend; 99 and college students are not legally required to be at
certain parts of their campus at any given time, whereas elementary
and secondary school students are required to be specific places on
campus during the day. 100 While these differences may appear to
justify greater protection from unbridled speech for pupils than for
college students, the following subsections demonstrate that these
differences are not as drastic as they may seem.
2. Mitigating the differences
The perceived differences between pupils and college students
fade to some extent on closer examination. First, as has already been
discussed, the majority of college students have not yet mentally
developed into mature adults. 101 Consequently, classifying high
school students as “minors” and 18- to 22-year-old college students
as “adults” might create an improper understanding. Indeed, in
addition to neuroscientists, car rental services 102 and psychologists 103

than college students because “[t]he ability of students to think for themselves increases with
age, whereas younger students are more likely to accept whatever a teacher says as true.”
(citing Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
banc))).
98. Daniel J. Trainor, Native American Mascots, Schools, and the Title VI Hostile
Environment Analysis, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 971, 989–991 (1995) (“Primary and secondary
school officials restrict student speech, but college and university officials do not.”).
99. Moran, supra note 96, at 503 (“Even when families are dissatisfied with their local
school, they may find it difficult to move to another district or pay tuition for a child to attend
a private institution.”).
100. See Greg C. Tenhoff, Censoring the Public University Student Press: A Constitutional
Challenge, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 511, 535 (1991) (“Moreover, university students are not a
captive audience as are high school students. Students are not required to attend college, nor
are they required to be on campns [sic] during any period of time.”). But see About Pepperdine,
PEPP. UNIV., http://www.pepperdine.edu/about/pepperdine/christiantradition/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2013) (“Each semester, all undergraduates [attending Pepperdine] are required to
attend 14 programs in the Convocation Series, which are activities aimed at building Christian
faith, affirming Christian values, or addressing ethical and moral issues within a Christian
worldview posed by current events.”). It is important to note that Pepperdine is a private
university and, consequently, would not be affected by an extension of the Garcetti rule.
101. See supra Part III.A.1.
102. Robin Marantz Henig, Why Are So Many People in Their 20s Taking so Long to Grow
Up?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/
magazine/22Adulthood-t.html?pagewanted=all (“[S]cientists found the children’s brains were
not fully mature until at least 25. ‘In retrospect I wouldn’t call it shocking, but it was at the
time,’ Jay Giedd, the director of the study, told me. ‘The only people who got this right were
the car-rental companies.’”); see also Kristen Hamlin, How to Rent a Car When You Are Under
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also suggest that 25 years of age might be a better line to distinguish
between minors and adults. Moreover, the prior discussion about the
classroom as a marketplace of ideas demonstrates that college
students actually have only a minimally greater opportunity—if
greater at all—to challenge their teachers’ speech than do pupils, at
least in the classroom. 104 College students are also similar to pupils in
other ways: for example, they are compelled, at least financially, to
attend school and—once they begin attending—to be in certain
places at certain times.
a. College students are financially compelled to attend class. Even
though college students are not legally compelled to attend classes as
pupils are, they are, to a large extent, financially compelled to attend.
Findings from the Bureau of Labor Statistics demonstrate that, for
persons 25 years old and older, college graduates have significantly
more—and significantly higher paying—jobs available to them than
people with only a high school diploma. 105 According to the Bureau,
the unemployment rate of individuals with just a high school
diploma exceeds that of individuals with a bachelor’s degree by 3.8
percentage points. 106 Additionally, individuals with just a bachelor’s
degree make an average of $21,528 more per year than high school
graduates. 107 Considering high school graduates make only $33,904
per year on average, 108 this is a significant difference.
Other statistics further demonstrate the increasing pressure to
attend college in the current job market. The percentage of high
school graduates who attend college has never been higher than
during the past decade. That percentage reached an all-time high in
2009 at 70% and is still at 66% as of 2013. 109 Part of the reason for
25, USA TODAY, http://traveltips.usatoday.com/rent-car-under-25-61224.html (last visited
Sept.9, 2014) (noting the difficulty and great expense of renting a car if you are under 25 due
to rental companies’ policies).
103. Wallis, supra note 73.
104. See supra Part III.A.2.
105. Employment Projections: Earnings and Unemployment Rates by Educational
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS
(May
22,
2013),
Attainment,
BUREAU
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm.
106. Id.
107. Id. (indicating that high school graduates make an average of $651 a week). For
some perspective, the poverty line for a single-person household in the United States is
$11,490. 2013 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV.,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm#thresholds (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
108. Employment Projections, supra note 105.
109. Most High School Grads Go to College in 2012; Drop-Outs Face Unemployment,
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these high numbers might be that high school students know it is
difficult for them to obtain a job if they do not have a college
education. After all, 34% of students who graduated from high school
last year and did not enroll in college are currently unemployed. 110
Additional findings from past censuses show that the percentage of the
national population age 25 and older who have obtained at least a
bachelor’s degree has increased from 4.6% in 1940 to 30.9% in
2012111 and that “[a]dults with bachelor’s degrees in the late 1970s
earned 55 percent more than adults who had not advanced beyond
high school. That gap grew to 75 percent by 1990—and is now at 85
percent.” 112 All of these statistics tend to show that high school
graduates are now expected—and almost financially required—to
attend college, a fact that was not always true.
b. College students are bound by graduation requirements.
Although college students admittedly have more liberty than pupils
to select the school they will attend, once they make that choice,
they face specific requirements that they must meet in order to
graduate. These requirements, while also technically followed
voluntarily, include mandates on where students need to be on
campus at specific times. 113 Often, students will have to take a
specific class that is taught by only one professor at limited times.
Legal scholars have noted that students in this type of class are
particularly likely to experience the same type of captivity that is
experienced by pupils. 114 While students can choose to enroll but
EXAMINER (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/most-high-school-grads-goto-college-2012-drop-outs-face-unemployment.
110. Id.
111. Figure 2: Percent of Population Age 25 and Over by Educational Attainment: 1940–
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
COMMERCE,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/
2012,
education/data/cps/historical/fig2.jpg (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). The percentage of people
with only a high school degree or some college experience in the same timeframe increased
from 19.6% to 56.7%. Id.
112. G. Scott Thomas, Earnings Widen Between College and High School-Only Grads, BUS.
JOURNALS (Dec. 28, 2012, 2:30 PM EST), http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/on-num
bers/scott-thomas/2012/12/grads-earn-85-more-than-those-without.html?page=all.
113. For example, class attendance and adherence to specific time and place requirements
for exams will be required for a passing grade in many classes.
114. See, e.g., Lisa M. Woodward, Collision in the Classroom: Is Academic Freedom a
License for Sexual Harassment?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 667, 682 (1999) (citing Arthur L.
Coleman & Jonathan R. Alger, Beyond Speech Codes: Harmonizing Rights of Free Speech and
Freedom from Discrimination on University Campuses, 23 J.C. & U.L. 91, 102, 117 (1996))
(“Students in a college or university classroom setting may well constitute a captive audience,
particularly if the class is required for graduation and no other sections are available.”).
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not attend those “mandatory” classes, such a choice will inhibit
their ability to secure a good grade in the course, to obtain a muchneeded letter of recommendation from the professor teaching the
course, or even to graduate from college at all (if they fail the course
as a result). Due to the financial pressure to obtain a degree, 115 and
to get good grades while doing so, 116 the choice to not attend these
required classes is more theoretical than real. For similar reasons,
college students may arguably constitute a captive audience even in
elective classes, especially if those classes help the students satisfy
minimum credit requirements for graduation.
While there may still be some differences between pupils and
college students that have not been mitigated, it is evident that the
two groups are not too dissimilar. In fact, the two groups are similar
enough that it seems reasonable to assert that college students, at
least in some scenarios, constitute a captive audience during class.
Even if courts are not willing to rule that college students are a
captive audience, the fact that college students are so similar to
pupils coupled with the fact that a college classroom is not a true
marketplace of ideas should lead courts to conclude that the
classroom speech of college professors (as well as that of elementary
and secondary school teachers) should not be exempt from the
Garcetti rule.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: SEPARATE TEACHING AND
SCHOLARSHIP
The conclusion that Garcetti should cover professors’ classroom
speech does not answer whether Garcetti should cover professional
speech related to scholarship. At first glance, it may seem that the two
words are inseparable—and thus deserve the same judicial
treatment—because they stem from much of the same research and
preparation. However, a more thorough consideration shows that the
two can be separated in the following manner: teaching is professors’
speech to students in a classroom or in their offices concerning
coursework, and scholarship is professors’ speech to other professors
outside the classroom setting. By separating the two terms in
elementary, secondary, and collegiate settings, Garcetti can apply (or
not apply) to speech related to teaching and scholarship in a manner
115. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
116. See supra Part III.A.2.
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that accommodates the principles behind the academic freedom
theory and the interests of students.
A. Speech Related to Teaching
When the definition of teaching is narrowed to include only
professors’ classroom speech, many of the arguments against
extending Garcetti to speech related to teaching lose a lot of
traction. This is especially true in light of the analysis concerning the
rights and roles students maintain in a classroom. 117 Because the
arguments appear to be less compelling with regard to a typical
classroom setting, it seems less necessary to exempt classroom speech
from the Garcetti rule. 118
While this conclusion may seem contrary to the academic
freedom theory, it is not clear that the academic freedom theory was
ever intended to cover individual professors or even their classroom
speech. Indeed, the most recent major Supreme Court cases to invoke
the academic freedom theory have protected the academic freedom of
academic institutions generally, not individual professors. 119 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has also held that professors do not have a
constitutional right to participate in university policy decisions,120 and
several circuit courts have affirmatively held that academic institutions
(and not individual teachers) have the right to set curriculum. 121
117. For example, because the classroom is not the type of place where students are
willing and able to challenge their professors’ theories, it seems that the classroom is not a
setting where students can freely inquire and evaluate; nor is it a marketplace of ideas. See
generally supra Part III.
118. Although individual teachers’ classroom speech should be covered by the Garcetti
rule, courts will not be discouraged from continuing to allow academic institutions to
determine curriculum without outside governmental interference. In this way, some aspects of
a professor’s classroom speech will be exempted from the Garcetti rule, at least insofar as the
institution allows the individual professor to participate in determining the curricula. See Minn.
State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 288 (1984) (ruling that professors do not
have a constitutional right to participate in their academic institution’s policymaking decisions
by stating that “[f]aculty involvement in academic governance has much to recommend it as a
matter of academic policy, but it finds no basis in the Constitution”).
119. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).
120. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 465 U.S. at 288. On the other hand, as some
scholars have pointed out, even without a constitutional right, “shared governance and
academic decisions often involve faculty input into policies and decisions of the institution.”
Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak no Evil: Academic Freedom and the Application of
Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 146 (2009).
121. See, e.g., Grossman v. S. Shore Pub. Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1097, 1100 (7th Cir. 2007)
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Determining that a professor does not have constitutional protection
from her governmental employer for her classroom speech does not
conflict with these rulings and would support the notion that academic
institutions should ultimately be in charge of determining who should
be admitted into their classrooms 122 and what should be taught
therein. 123 Even under this proposal, however, individual professors are
not entirely unprotected because their classroom speech can be shielded
from institutional interference through tenure124 and through other
means, such as state constitutional or statutory law.125 As a result, First
Amendment interests are protected in other ways.
B. Speech Related to Scholarship
Unlike professors’ speech related to teaching, their speech related
to scholarship should not be governed by the Garcetti rule. When
scholarship is defined as speech among professors outside of a
classroom, which includes a professor’s individual research, there are
two factors that dictate that Garcetti should not apply to such speech:
first, scholarship, unlike teaching, is “peculiarly a marketplace of
(quoting Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 1979)) (“The First Amendment is
‘not a teacher license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular content.’”);
Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370–71 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 813 (1998) (“We agree with Plato and Burke and Justice Frankfurter that the school, not the
teacher, has the right to fix the curriculum.”); Bishop v. Arnov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1077 (11th Cir.
1991) (“The University’s conclusions about course content must be allowed to hold sway over an
individual professor’s judgments.”); Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir. 1986)
(“And matters such as course content, homework load, and grading policy are core university
concerns, integral to implementation of this policy decision. . . . The first amendment does not
require that each nontenured professor be made a sovereign unto himself.”). See also Tepper, supra
note 120, at 180 (“[T]hough initially concerned with individual faculty rights, academic freedom has
taken on a decidedly institutional character: it protects the freedom of the institution to decide
internal matters including selection of personnel, curriculum, and teaching methods.”).
122. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
123. See cases cited supra note 121.
124. After earning tenure, professors’ “service should be terminated only for adequate
cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circumstances because of
financial exigencies.” AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS & ASS’N OF AM. COLLS., 1940
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 4 (2006), available at
http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure.
125. See infra Part V.B (explaining in part the pressures faced by an institution that may
indirectly protect professors’ speech rights); See also Tepper, supra note 120, at 130 (“[W]hile
academic freedom may be best protected by tenure, other mechanisms apart from federal
constitutional protection may offer some shelter, including state constitutional and statutory
law, freedom of contract and collective bargaining provisions, and academic policy.”).

1007

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/22/2015 4:01 PM

2014

ideas”; and, second, many of the academic freedom principles
articulated by the Supreme Court can be preserved by solely
protecting professors’ scholarship.
1. Scholarship is peculiarly a marketplace of ideas
Most of the barriers that prevent a classroom from being a true
marketplace of ideas are absent in the realm of scholarship. For
example, professors are not dependent on grades determined by
other professors in their field. It is true that professors are reliant
upon each other to some degree (e.g., peer reviews and networking),
but there is generally a level of respect among professors that makes
this reliance less speech-chilling. Similarly, professors are generally
experienced enough to no longer be as impressionable as a typical
student. While there are certainly exceptions, most professors are
older than 25, and those who are not have already demonstrated a
high level of intellectual maturity by going through all the steps to
become a professor at a young age.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, professors have enough
knowledge concerning their subject matter to truly challenge other
professors in their field. The same qualifications that make professors
vastly more capable of presenting a plausible theory than students
also enable professors to adequately challenge each other’s theories.
In other words, professors in similar fields will know enough about
the subject to sift out flaws or false assumptions in each other’s
theories. 126 This mutually held skill creates an environment in which
truth can be more readily ascertained than in just about any other
setting, thus establishing a true marketplace of ideas that may deserve
a special niche in First Amendment jurisprudence. 127
2. Academic freedom principles in scholarship
Not only does exempting speech related to scholarship satisfy the
Court’s desire to protect speech in settings that are “peculiarly the

126. See, e.g., Quality and Value: The True Purpose of Peer Review, NATURE (2006),
available at http://www.nature.com/nature/peerreview/debate/nature05032.html (“At its
best, the peer review system provides not only expert advice, but also a strong incentive for
authors to heed the advice and to improve the paper.”).
127. Other such settings may include debates among informed politicians or in brain trusts. It is
worth noting that these settings usually also consist of people who are considered to be experts in
their fields.
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marketplace of ideas,” but it also appears to independently advance
other academic freedom principles. As discussed above, it is
debatable whether the academic freedom theory should protect the
speech of individual professors at all. 128 However, when the Court
has indicated that the speech of individual professors might be
entitled to special First Amendment protection, it has done so in a
manner that peculiarly points towards protecting scholarship. Most
notably, the Court has frequently recognized the importance of
allowing professors to explore their fields of study and remain
uninhibited in their own search for truth. 129 For reasons mentioned
in the previous subsection, 130 it is clear that a professor’s exploration
and pursuit of truth will usually be more fruitful when she is
conducting research, writing scholarly pieces, or conversing with her
peers than when she is teaching her students.
Therefore, because academic freedom principles can be
adequately advanced by protecting only speech related to scholarship
and because speech among professors—unlike speech between
professors and students in a classroom—is peculiarly a marketplace of
ideas, speech related to scholarship should be exempted from the
Garcetti rule, whereas speech related to teaching should not be.
V. RESPONSES TO LIKELY CRITICISMS
Although it has only been seven years since Garcetti, there has
already been enough discussion of the case’s potential implications to
recognize some major criticisms of the proposed solution. The three
most apparent criticisms are that, although the solution may sound
good in theory, it will be difficult to separate teaching from
scholarship in practice; that a regulated classroom will prevent

128. See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Teachers . . . must be exemplars of openmindedness and free inquiry.”). On a related note, it is also arguable that a student’s ability to
freely inquire would actually be inhibited by exempting speech related to teaching from the
Garcetti rule because of the same factors that indicate that the classroom is not a marketplace
of ideas. For example, if a professor decided, against her employer’s will, that she was not
going to teach all viewpoints on a particular topic, the students’ information stream would be
stifled and they would likely not be able to challenge the professor to teach the withheld
information.
130. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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students from obtaining the cutting-edge information they need and
pay for; and that the government should not restrict the speech of
those it funds to convey a private message (i.e., professors).
A. Professors’ Teaching Stems from Scholarship
Scholars have noted that, at least at a collegiate level, it might be
impractical to separate teaching from scholarship. 131 Specifically,
critics may claim, professors necessarily use the fruits of their
scholarship as part of their curriculum. 132 An inability to do so would
prevent professors from fully presenting pertinent materials to their
students. Moreover, if curriculum and teaching decisions are
protected only at a university level, the limitation on professors’
speech would expand to the point that a professor may never know
which viewpoints she is allowed to present to a class—a completely
speech-chilling result.
While such an outcome seems somewhat troubling, it can be
easily prevented. Colleges have a vested interest in a professor’s
scholarship and in her teaching because a college’s reputation among
scholars and current and prospective students largely depends on the
quality of both types of speech. Additionally, if a professor is
regarded as a prominent scholar in a particular field, it seems
counterproductive for a college to stifle that professor from sharing
her beliefs with her students. Accordingly, the ideal situation to
avoid conflicts between professors and their colleges would be for
colleges to allow professors to present many different ideas—
including the fruits of their own scholarship—in the classroom, so
long as the professors refrain from promoting (as opposed to merely
presenting) any of those ideas. While students will certainly
understand that the professor believes the viewpoints that she
expresses in her work product, that understanding will not prevent

131. See, e.g., Forster, supra note 55, at 697 (“Although teaching and scholarship may
often be intertwined at the university level, the same cannot usually be said of public primary
and secondary schools.”). Forster does not go into any depth beyond this statement about the
two types of speech being intertwined, so the argument in this paper is merely inferential.
Additionally, because Forster specifically stated that this argument did not readily apply to
elementary and secondary school teachers, the response to this argument will focus solely on
college professors.
132. Additionally, it should be noted that sometimes professors teach seminars that
explore the issues they are writing about. Admittedly, the teaching in these classes obviously
furthers scholarship, but these classes seem to be a rather narrow exception.
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them from sincerely delving into other viewpoints so long as the
professor presents other views in the best light possible. 133 Thus,
professors would be able to voice their own opinions in a manner
that is less likely to indoctrinate and limit the viewpoints available to
their students. Such a situation should also advance the interests of
the college that employs the professor. After all, the institution funds
the professor to research and teach within a specific field. 134 By
allowing a professor to express her findings to her students, a college
realizes a return on its investment rather than shutting down the very
speech that it funded the professor to develop in the first place.
Even if such a scenario is not realized at any given college, and
the college decides to stifle professors from presenting the fruits of
their own scholarship (or any other speech) in the classroom, the
proposed separation between speech related to scholarship and
speech related to teaching would still allow professors to speak freely
among themselves. Additionally, it would not prevent students from
investigating the fruits of their professors’ scholarship on their own.
In sum, just because a professor’s speech would be protected to a
lesser degree when she is teaching than when she is participating in
scholarship does not necessarily mean that she could not use the
fruits of her scholarship in her teaching. Nor does it mean that her
students would be deprived of the opportunity to learn from the
professor’s scholarship if she is prohibited from sharing her
scholarship with the class—though they might have to do so during
their free time.
B. Without Free Speech in Teaching, Students Will be Deprived of
Cutting-Edge Subjects
Another argument presented by several courts 135 and scholars is
that Garcetti cannot govern speech related to teaching because such
governance would deprive college students of receiving the cutting-

133. Students may still parrot the professor’s ideas in class and on exams, but at least they
would be exposed to other ideas.
134. Jennifer Elrod, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and the Public University, 22
BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 64 (2004) (“[Professors] are paid to develop theories and to speak,
write, and teach about their intellectual labors in all stages of the creation, dissemination, and
reformulation of those ideas.”).
135. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”).
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edge information they need and pay for. These critics argue that
without some First Amendment protection from their employing
universities, professors would be too worried about being disciplined
for unpopular speech to address any controversial or cutting-edge
issues in the classroom. 136 However, it is in the best interest of colleges
and universities to allow their professors to discuss these cutting-edge
issues in class. Students often choose to attend particular colleges
precisely because those colleges—or even specific professors—have a
reputation for delving into cutting-edge subjects. 137 If a college gains a
reputation for forbidding or ignoring such subjects, its academic
reputation would likely diminish and enrollment (or the quality of
students who do enroll) would likely decline as potential students
choose to attend schools that address those subjects. Additionally, the
separate treatment of classroom speech and scholarship would allow
professors to continue to obtain cutting-edge information and provide
them the opportunity to persuade their schools to teach that
information without fear of retaliation.
On a related note, some post-Garcetti cases arise from a
professor’s criticism of the administration of the college or university
made in his or her capacity as a professor. 138 This kind of speech is
not the cutting-edge or educational material that the courts are so
eager to protect in the classroom and, therefore, it does not deserve
added protection within the classroom. However, by exempting
scholarship from the Garcetti rule, such speech would still be
protected when it is addressed to other professors or administrators,
a result that seems justifiable and fair.
C. The Government Funds Professors to be Private Speakers
The final criticism against the proposed solution is that collegiate
professors should not be considered public employees for Garcetti
purposes because they are funded by the government to promote

136. See, e.g., supra note 53.
137. Robert Morse, Students Say College Rankings Aren’t Most Important Part of
Decision, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/collegerankings-blog/2010/02/04/students-say-college-rankings-arent-most-important-part-ofdecision (noting that a national survey of incoming Freshmen revealed that 63.6% of students
listed that it was “very important” that the college they chose had a very good academic
reputation, the highest such percentage of any criteria listed on the survey).
138. See, e.g., Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008).
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private messages. The general argument is summarized by one scholar
as follows:
[C]ontrary to Garcetti, an academic’s status as a public employee is
more similar to the public funding of lawyers described in
Velazquez, where the government provided federal funding to
lawyers offering free legal services to indigent clients. The Court
explained that the lawyers receiving the government funding were
not speaking as agents of the government because Congress gave
the money to the lawyers to convey private messages. Academics
employed by public universities are also not speaking as agents of
the government because the university provides them with a salary
to convey private messages in the form of their scholarship. 139

It is true that the government funds professors’ scholarship and it
is also true that universities are different from other governmental
agencies, but these facts actually seem to cut against the idea that all
professional academic speech should be exempted from the Garcetti
rule. For example, because universities are different from other
governmental agencies, funding from the two sources should
arguably be treated differently as well. Regarding professors’ speech,
the funding for scholarship often comes from outside agencies
whereas the funding for teaching comes primarily from the university
itself. 140 This seems to indicate that although the government may
fund professors to be private citizens in scholarship settings,
professors are still the agents of the university while teaching. That
professors are agents of their employing university while teaching
seems correct because, as noted above, 141 a university is largely
dependent upon the quality and content of its professors’ classroom
speech and because universities ultimately control the curriculum.
Therefore, it is completely logical to allow the college to closely
monitor classroom speech without fear of judicial retribution.
Consequently, even if one accepts the argument that the government
funding provided to professors simply promotes their private

139. Beckstrom, supra note 53, at 1230. Beckstrom also emphasizes that colleges are
different than other governmental agencies. This difference stems from the fact that “[w]hen
students attend a public university, they enter with the intent to receive an education. The
university serves as a marketplace of ideas.” Id.
140. This does, however, depend largely on the discipline. Most scientific and
engineering research is funded by outside grants. Humanities and law, by contrast, do not
usually involve much outside funding.
141. See supra Part V.B.
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messages, the relevant funding primarily promotes speech that is
related to scholarship, 142 not speech related to teaching. This result
further endorses the separate treatment of the two types of speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to their unique role as the primary recipient of speech
related to teaching, students deserve special attention when
determining how much First Amendment protection public
professors should receive while performing their official duties. This
Note has demonstrated that when such attention is paid to the role
students play in the classroom, it becomes evident that the Garcetti
rule should govern professional speech related to teaching but not
professional speech related to scholarship.
Aaron Worthen*

142. Indeed, even the author of the criticism itself refers to a professor’s private message
as “scholarship.” Beckstrom, supra note 53, at 1228.
* J.D., 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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